Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) blurred the concepts of civilian and military on various levels, from the actual mission and its restrictions on using force to the tasks involved in accomplishing the mission and the very space of the bases where soldiers served. 1 International troops first travelled to BiH in 1992 as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), mandated to guard humanitarian convoys and guarantee the demilitarization of the UN Safe Areas. After December 1995 and the Dayton Peace Agreement, the multinational military force came under NATO control with a new mission to implement Dayton and provide continuing security. Personnel rotated in and out of BiH at regular (usually six-month) intervals, writing one or more tours in 'the Balkans' into hundreds of thousands of military lives.
Most scholars of peacekeeping in BiH concentrate on the diplomatic and doctrinal structuring of the mission (e.g. Gow 1997; Ripley 1999; Burg and Shoup 2000; Thornton 2000) . Some, more recently, have used ethnographic fieldwork or qualitative interviewing to discuss peacekeepers' on-the-ground experiences (e.g. Kernic 1999; Koedijk 2002; Kretchik 2004; Bos and Soeters 2006; Sion 2008) . The presence of a large semi-permanent military force all too often invites an informal economy of smuggling and sexual exploitation that undermines the intervention's stated aims (Skjelsbaek 2004; Andreas 2008) . These angles on the study of peacekeeping expose a common contradiction of using specialized military organizations, personnel and equipment to accomplish change in the civilian environment.
In peacekeeping and peace support operations, forces with an organizational culture which has developed to facilitate high-intensity warfighting must reorient themselves around a strategic goal of peace and consent, not victory. The strategic studies experts Christopher Dandeker and James Gow (1999: 65-67) oral history interviews with local and international people who were involved in carrying out or preparing for peacekeeping work. 3 Analysing and coding the data revealed that encounters between and constructions of civilian and military were central to many of the narratives, articulated around four dimensions of difference:
uniforms, weapons, disruptiveness and training.
The uniformed body Uniforms, immediate visible signs of belonging to the military rather than the civilian world, confer the authority of sponsoring state or non-state entities on military people and their actions. Beyond the battlefield function of camouflage, modern industrial militaries' highly-regulated uniforms denote individual bodies as parts of the collective, signal organizational subdivisions to those in the know and mark out 'the military figure as the specialist purveyor of the means of violence' (Giddens 1985: 230) . The international law of war protects prisoners if they are wearing uniforms distinguishing them from civilians (Pfanner 2004: 118-20 Local employees were elevated above fellow citizens through these privileges but still experienced a power inequality relative to international soldiers. This inequality resembled the double asymmetry of their economic position, where they would earn much more than a local company or state institution would pay but would still receive less than the going rate in the force's home country. However, not even the soldiers had limitless physical power. Their own power was regulated by rules of engagement (ROE) and relativized situationally: body armour and a sidearm would have different values depending on whether one was on street patrol talking to civilians, outnumbered by local soldiers at a checkpoint or coming under artillery fire.
Certain missions or career tracks also complicated the military ideal of weapons proficiency. After BiH, Louise had subsequently gone on a humanitarian mission to Rwanda with a parachute field ambulance. She remembered anxieties about the Army doctors, whose Sandhurst training had been 'a four-week course to […] do a bit of marching, a bit of polish on boots, and how to put a uniform on'. They therefore had not 'done quite as much weapon training' as other army officers, although 'my fears were totally unfounded, they were the most professional soldiers ever'. The UN's decision not to arm UNMOs made them even more ambiguous. The senior UNMO quoted above compared himself to the local civilian staff -'We were as unarmed as the interpreters' -as he explained the UNMOs' parameters: they could only threaten to withhold UN resources such as aid convoys, ambulances or helicopters and could not compel action through direct physical force or even direct financial inducements.
At the same time, he believed unarmed military observers had been preferable to a US proposal for a post-Dayton armed observer organization. The weapon had not been essential to the task ('striding around with a pistol on your hip doesn't make you a more effective liaison officer'), as central as it was to a fundamental understanding of the trained military body.
The UN mandate and UNPROFOR's ROE had even more problematic effects on soldiers' perceptions of their capacity to fulfil their professional and military identities.
One Danish conscript, a volunteer for UNPROFOR in Croatia, felt that the UN's need for transparency had threatened the troops' ability to do their job, telling the author: volunteered for an IFOR transport unit then felt disappointed because they had expected being able to fight (unlike traditional UN peacekeeping) and were left to cope in a peace-building situation that 'challenged the soldiers' self-esteem as warriors' (Kernic 1999: 122-23) .
The restrictions imposed during the war by the UNPROFOR mandate left many peacekeepers -for instance, British witnesses to the Bosniak-Croat conflict -feeling stripped of their power to confront local armed forces and save civilian lives. The mandate's focus on safeguarding aid convoys not humans, and the difficulties of obtaining air-strikes, both interfered with the belief that innocent civilians required protection and that it was the soldier's task to provide it. In April 1993, the first Physical hardship exposed further differences between soldiers and civilian interpreters. Resilience to discomfort is an inalienable aspect of the military subjectivity: initial military training accustoms the body to strenuous physical activity, sleep deprivation and improvised outdoor living, both as a stimulus to primary group bonding and as preparation for experiencing such conditions on operations.
Interpreters, being civilians, were not expected to meet the same resilience standardsalthough those who worked during the war and lived in (e.g.) besieged Sarajevo, Goražde or Srebrenica were in fact experiencing greater physical danger and shortages at home than the peacekeepers on the base. Soldiers' treatment of the interpreters varied between chivalry and disregard. Some, including the more involved military supervisors, attempted to arrange better living conditions for their employees than themselves. When Louise's base was without showers for a week, for instance, she was content to improvise for herself -'that's army life, you know, you get used to that' -but obtained transport to drive her team of interpreters to showers at another British base.
Interpreters in teams simultaneously made their own judgements about resilience.
Edin, who had still been in his late teens when he worked for a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team, explained that he and a male colleague had volunteered for longer assignments to spare their female colleagues:
Well, I can tell you this. In CIMIC, in the period from '96 to 2000, there were four of us. Two guys and two girls. Two male and two female. So, mostly it was my male colleague and myself that were travelling, going out in the fields.
Travelling a lot. You know, trying to keep our two female colleagues in the offices, because of course… I'm not being sexist, it's really sometimes hard for a girl to go out in a field for a couple of days or several days. So, from talking to my male colleague, he didn't mind also travelling a lot, because he also enjoyed it.
Q: So why was it harder for a girl to do that?
A: Well, if you don't have toilets, you know, loos, as you Brits would say, sometimes if you had to spend a night away from your home, at that time hotels or motels were in, you know, really bad shape. I remember sleeping in a sleeping bag out in a field, literally on the field. Even, we wouldn't even have a tent at that time. So of course that's harder on a girl than on a guy. Just normal stuff.
Sinan, who worked for British infantry companies at Goražde during the war and later who's never seen any of that kind of stuff before'.
The military person was distinguished by his or her readiness, resistance to exertion, proficiency with weapons and ability to look after oneself and others (Chris and his colleague Fred discussed local and military interpreters in similar terms). In certain other contexts, having to be responsible for people without these attributes in danger zones could produce resentment. Tony, a British artillery officer stationed near Prijedor in 1996, resented that on an unpredictable election day he had been asked to guard an inter-entity crossing point as security for civilian election monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe: 5 'they were just civilians who had volunteered, through philanthropy, really, to go and do this', 'they had no military training' and they caused more problems than they solved. Yet interpreters were largely excused from the category of unnecessary civilian because they were seen as essential for carrying out the soldiers' mission (unlike the election monitors, who might have been important to the broader political process in BiH but had little to contribute to what Tony understood as his part in the immediate mission in Prijedor).
Their disruption to the framework of military and civilian cultures could be rationalized by treating interpreters as communicative tools or could be managed through a professionalization process that aimed to instil a military-compatible subjectivity.
The trained body Chris had also apostrophized the interpreter who could not be expected to cope on a battlefield as 'the girl with the flowery hair or the boy with the beautiful hairstyle'.
The construction suggested that interpreters' non-functional concern with personal appearance confounded the military subjectivity, but also complicated the archetypal gender structure of masculinity in combat and femininity supporting male warriors (see Elshtain 1985) . Claire Duncanson (2009: 70) Journalists, however, embed themselves with military units to achieve a divergent goal and on behalf of a separate organization. Local interpreters are normatively working to achieve the same goals as the military, and they also differ from the embedded journalists' example because the journalist will typically embed with a unit from the same country and is able to presume some cultural familiarity. For soldiers to accommodate the local interpreters' presence was a far more mundane challenge than for them to come to terms with the threats to their identity as a soldier than a peacekeeping mission could pose, but both phenomena forced them to make sense of what it meant to belong or not to belong to the military or civilian world. Although parties on both sides of the relationship found everyday ways to resolve the disruption and contradiction, the ultimate means of distinction remained the embodied subjectivity of the military profession.
